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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
Case No.
vs.
SALA~1:0N

9640

JULIAN SANCHEZ,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 22nd day of N ovemhe·r, 1961, in the Third
Judicial District Court, Defendant was convicted of havin fraudulently obtained a narcotic drug in violation of
Title 58, Chapter 13, Section 35, Utah Code Annotated
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1953, as .amended, 1961. Defendant prays for reversal on
the grounds that: (1) The Trial Court committed error
in refusing defense counsel the right to obt.ain information necessary ~to his defense, and (2) The statute upon
which Defendant's conviction stands is vague and ambiguous as applied in this case, and, therefore, void under
the Due Process Clauses of our State and Federal Constitutions.

DISPOSITION MADE IN LOWER COURT
The trial was held on June 16, 1961, before the Honor1ahle Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah. A jury was impanelled and the trial proceeded.
'Tihe State and the defense, having presented their
cases, were advised by the Court of the proposed jury
instructions. Counsel for the Defendant excepted to one
of the proposed instructions and also excepted to the
Court's refusal to give two of the Defendant's requested
instructions.
'Thereupon, counsel for the defense moved for the
dismissal of the jury and submitted the case for the
Court's disposition.
~The Defendant was found guilty as charged in the
information.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of Trial Court's Judgment.
STAT'EMEN·T OF FACTS
A complaint was issued on the 26th of June·, 1961,
charging the Defendant, SALAMON JULIAN SANCHEZ, with the violation of Title 58, Chaper 13a, Section 35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, by Laws
of Utah 1955, Chapter 94, as follows:
"That the· said Salamon Julian Sanchez ... ,
at the time aforesaid, did wilfully and unlawfully
obtain a narcotic drug, ~to wit: Paregoric, by the
use of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge." (R-10)
On October 24, 1961, at 10 :00 o'clock a.m., Defendant appeared with counsel and preliminary hearing was
held. (R-2)
Defendant was duly arraigned on November 6, 1961,
and entered a plea of not guilty. (R-13)
At trial, the evidence tended to show that the Defendant and two others obtained paregoric from the
Corner Drug Store .at 401 South 9th East. The trio obtained the paregoric after a member of the trio, other
than the Defendant, persuaded a Dr. Ludlow of Spanish
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Fork, Utah, to authorize the purchase of the paregoric,
upon the representation that a sister of one of the trio
was ill and in need of the paregoric. (R-16, 17). Earlier
evidence tended to show that in fact, the representations
made to Dr. Ludlow were false. R-16, 17)
The State then called upon two witnesses. J\{r. Trosper, the pharmacist at the Corner Drug Store, was called
upon to testify that the paregoric which was sold to the
Defendant's co-conspirator and the paregoric sample
admitted into evidence were both taken from the same
containe~r. (R-20, 21)
Mr. Elmer Christensen, the State Chernist, was called
next and testified that he conducted a chemical analysis
of the paregoric sample which was admitted into evidenee.

He further testified that he established the

preS'ence of codeine in the paregoric sample, but that he
did not determine the percentage of codeine or the number of grains of codeine per fluid ounce. (R-23)
The State rested and the Defendant was called upon
to tes,tify in his o·wn behalf. The defense rested after the
Defendant was cross-exan1ined.

(R-:~3)

Upon the T'rial Court's refusal to include Defendant's requested instructions nmnbered one and two, and
upon the Court's insistence of giving instruction nmnber
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4-A of the Court's ·proposed instructions, defense counsel
moved to dismiss the jury and the case was submitted to
the trial judge for detennination. (R-26, 27, 28)
The Defendant was found guilty as charged and the
matter was referred to the Adult Probation Board for
the pre-sentence report. (R-28, 29)

ST.NTEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMI'TTED ERROR IN DENYING
DEFENSE COUNSEL THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE.
POINT II
THE STATUE UPON WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION STANDS IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS AS APPLIED TO THIS CASE, AND THEREFORE, VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS.

ARGUl\fENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING
DEFENSE COUNSEL THE RIGHT 'TO OBTAIN INFORMATION NECESSARY TO THE DEFENSE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

The Defendant, in the case at bar, was charged and
convicted for violating Section 58-13-35, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 1961. This section of the Uniform Narcotic Drug act reads :
"No pe,rson shall obtain or attempt to obtain a narcotic drug, or procure or attempt to pro-cure the administration of a narcotic drug, (1)
by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or subterfuge,
or ( 2) by the forgery or alteration of a prescription or of any written order, or (3) by the' concealment of a material fact, or (4) by the use of
a false name or the giving of a false address."
The legislature has stated that the term "narcotic
drug'' means:
"Coco leaves, opium, cannabis, and every substance neither chemically nor physically distinguishable from thmn ... "Sec. 58-13-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.
Isolated and read separately from the rest of the
provisions of the Narcotics Drug Act, tlwse two sections
lead one to believe that the prosecution unquestionably
<>Htablished a prima facie ease against the Defendant inasntuch as the defense counsel stipulated to the facts
as presented by the State (R-16-19) and the State subsequently established by testimony that tl1e paregoric sample which was introduced into evidenee contained eodeine,
a derivative of opium, although the quantity of codeine
per fluid ounce was not established. (R-23)
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However, if the entire Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
is read as a whole, and as it should he, we find that the
legislature did not intend to make this Act applicable 'to
all narcotic drug tr,affic irrespective of the quantity of
narcotic in the drug involved. On the contrary, by virtue
of Section 58-13-17, of our Gode, as amended, by Section
58-13a-17, the legislature has exempted from the scope
of the Act, any drugs or medicinal prepa,ration which
contain less than a specified quantity of narcotics. Section 58-13a-17 reads :
''Except as otherwise in this act specifically
provided this Act shall not apply to the following cases:
1) Administering, dispensing, or selling at
retail of any medicinal preparation that contains
in one fluid ounce, or if a solid or semi-solid preparation, in one avoirdupois ounce, not more than
one grain of codeine or any of its salts.'''
At trial, no evidence was presented by the prosecution which would have established the nareotic content
in the paregoric which the Defendant allegedly obtained.
The State Chemist testified that he conducted a chemical analysis of the paregoric. However, he further testified that his only purpose in conducting the analysis was
to determine \Yhether the paregoric contained any codeine, not to de,termine the exact quantity of codeine.
(R.-23) The exeeption of Section 58-13a-17 was not overcome by proof.
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Notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove
away the exception of Section 58-13a-17, the State may
rely upon Section 58'-13-42 which states :
"In any complaint, information, or indictment, and in any action or proceeding brought for
the enforcement of any provision of this Act, it
shall not be necessary to negative any exception,
excuse, proviso, or exemption, contained in this
Act, and the burden of proof of any exemptions,
proviso, or exemption shall be upon the D,efendant."
Assuming for tihis case, the validity of Section 5813a-42, the Trial Court's error in restricting the information demanded by defense counsel by his request for a
Bill of Particulars is unquestionable.
The record discloses that defense counsel, at the time
of arraignment, requested a Bill of Particulars for the
following questions:

"1. Does the [sic] 'pal'lagoric' involved in this
case contain eodeine or any of its salts~"
"2. If 'the answer to $1 is 'yes,' how many
grains of codeine or its salts per fluid ounce does
it contain~"
"3. Does the [sic] 'paragoric' involved in tllis
case eontain any other narcotic drug~"
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"4. Does the [sic] 'paragoric' involved in this
case contain any other medicinal elements or compounds :in addition to its narcotic drug content~"
(R-30)
The :answers which the D,efendant demanded would have
afforded him the opportunity to carry the burden of
proving the exemption of Section 58-13a-17, in compliance
with Section 58-13a-42. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended. The State was in possession of the paregoric
sample. The District Attorney could have determined
the answers to the questions submitted by Defendant's
request for a Bill of P articulars.
1

The legislature has explicitly provided, m circumstances such as this, that the Defendant may den1and
information if the information demanded is necessary
to his def'f~nse. Section 77-21-9 of our Code reads:

''1. When an information or indietment
charges an offense in accordance with the pro-visions of Section 77-21-8, but fails to inform
the Defendant of tlhe particulars of the offense,
sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense,
or to give him such information as he is entitled
under the Constitution of this State, the court
may, of its own motion, and shall at the request
of the Defendant, order the prosecuting attorney
to furnish a Bill of Particulars containing such
information as may be necessary for these purposes ... "
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This section appears to provide ·the defens·e, as a
matter of right, information necessary to his defense if
the circumstances justify the demand. The legislature
states that the Defendant shall be furnished a Bill of
Particulars containing such information necessary to his
defense. In State vs. Solomon, 93 U. 619, 71 P2d 104,
106, our Supreme Court held:
"Tthe granting of the Bill of Particulars is not
discretionary with the court as it was in commonlaw, but it is a right which the Defendant can
demand and which the court must grant if the
statutory conditions exists.''
Certainly, the defense is not entitled to a complete
disclosure of the prosecution's case, but inasu1uch as the
Defendant was confronted with the burden of pro:ving
any and all e:x:emptions and exceptions to the Narcotic
Drug Act, and inasmuch as the evidence was in the sole
custody of the prosecution, the defense was entitled to
information which would have aided him in carrying his
burden. More specifically, Defendant should have been
provided with information as to the codeine content per
fluid ounce in t!he paregoric. Also, it should he noted
that the use of the Bill of Particulars is not limited to
incidents wher·e the indictment or information is defective. On the contrary, the statute specifieally provides for
the use of the Bill of Particulars even ''when an inforInation or indictment charges an offens·e in accordance
·with the provisions of Seetion 77-:21-8." Seetion 77-219 U.C.A., 1953.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
If we assume that the: St'ate has the burden of proving the entire case including the burden of proving away
the exceptions, we must further assume that the State
failed to establish a prima facie case inasmuch as the
quantity of codeine per fluid ounce of the paregoric in
question was not established and the exception of Section 58-13a-17 was not overcome.
On the other hand, if, pursuant to Section 58-13a-42,
the Defendant has the burden of proving the exceptions
and exemptions of our Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, there
is no doubt that Defendant should hav·e been provided
with a complete and responsive bill of particulars so as
to provide Defendant the opportunity of determining the
quantity of codeine in the paregoric sample. As an alternative to this, the Trial Judge, having denied the Defendant the right to obtain the necessary information,
should have placed upon the prosecution, the burden of
proving away the exceptions. Unless this is done, a Defendant in similar cases would be faced with this dilemma; he would be obliged to assume the burden of proving
the exceptions and exemptions as provided by statute,
but he 'Would be unable to do so because of the lirnitations
placed upon him by the Trial Court's ruling.
Finally, some questions may arise as to the applicability of the exe1nption under Section 58-13a-17 to this
case. In Folenius vs. Eckle) 164 NE 2d, 458, 460, 109 Ohio
App. 132, (1960), the Defendant was charged with hav-
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ing unlawfully obtained a narcotic drug, to wit: Paregoric, in violation of the Ohio "LT niform Narcotic Drug
Aet. Also included in this act is an exemption similar to
that of Section 58-13a-17 of our Code. The Ohio Revised
Code, 8ec. 3719.15 reads:
"The .act shall not apply:
(a) Where a practitioner administers or dispenses; or where a pharmacist or owner of a
pharmacy sells at retail any medicinal preparati<on that contains in one fluid ounce, or is a solid
or s·emi-solid preparation, in one avoirdupois
ounce:
(1) not more than two grains of opium,

(2) not more than one quarter a grain of morphine or any of its salts:
( 3) not more than one grain of codeine or
any of its salts.''
Upon a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the
Defendant was released. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in
ih~ opinion . .dated:
•'Pharmacopeia, of which we take judicial
notie.e, states that in 1000 n1l of paregoric there
are 40 ml opiun1 tincture. When the formula is
reduced to grains, it appears that paregoric contains 1.82 grains of opi1un in each fluid ounce.
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Consequently, paregoric contains less than 2
grains of opium in each fluid ounce, which bring
the preparation within the exception of the statute."
Also, in People vs. Kal1tnaJ 335 P2d, 246, 168 C.A.
2d 34, although the court was called upon to resolve a
somewhat different problem, throughout the opinion, the
California Court implies that if the ·exemption had be·en
proved, the Defendant would not have been convicted.
The same is true in United States vs. Laue,rsJ C.A. 7th
Cir., 1961) 287 F .2d 633.
If any distinctions exist between Folenius vs. Eckle
and the case at bar, it would merely be that in the fonner
case, the court was concerned with the opium content
and not the codeine content of paregoric. To digre·ss for
a moment, if we assume that certain paregoric mixtures
contain 1.82 grains of opium per fluid ounc.e, and if we
further assume, as the record discloses, (R-23) that codeine is a derivative of opium, is it not highly possible
that certain paregoric mixtures contain less tihan 1 grain
of codeine per fluid ounce~ If the paregoric sample in
question contained less than one grain of codeine per
fluid ounce, would the case not fall under the exemption
of Section 58-13a-17 of our Code? Both of these questions
should unquestionably be answ-ered in the affirmative.
Our penal statutes should not be construed and employed in a manner which would r'ender a defense im-
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possible. The Defendant, having had the burden of proving ,the exemptions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,
in compliance with Section 58-13a-42 of our Code, should
have been provided with the information demanded by
his request for a Bill of Particulars. The 'Trial Court,
having denied this demand, should have placed upon the
prosecution, the burden of proving away the exemptions
and ,exceptions.
The Defendant respectfully submits that the Trial
Court comn1itted error in denying Defendant information necessary to his defense and this cause should, therefore, be reversed and remanded for a trial de novo.
POINT II.
THE STATUTES UPON WHICH THE DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION STANDS. AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE, ARE
UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS AND, THEREFORE, VIOLATE 'THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF OUR FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

In the ease at bar, the only n1eans by which the Defendant's conviction could be upheld is to assume that
the- defense, in failing to prove the exemption of Sec.tion
5R'-13a-l7 of our Code. failed to overcome the evidence
presented by the State.
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If we assume that the conviction as it stands, is
valid, and if we further assume that the facts and e,vidence in this case, are sufficient to uphold the conviction, we are logically compelled to make the ultimrute
assumption that for this case, Section 58-13a-17 and 7721-9 are without force and effect.
For example, we are involved here with a statute
which prohibits the fraudulent obtaining of any narcotic
drugs. Still another provision exempts certain drugs
which do not eontain the specified amount of narcotics.
A third provision states that in any trial involving the
fraudulent obtaining of narcotics, the Defendant is obliged to carry the burden of proving the exemptions. A
fourth statutory provision provides Defendant with the
necessary tool by whic:h he may demand from the State,
information necessary for his defense, to wit: a Bill of
Particulars.
The State initiates criminal proceedings upon the
first statute; the court, pursuant to the third statute
places the burden of proving the exemptions of the second st'atute upon the Defendant.
In an attempt to comply with the fourth statutory
provision, the Defendant demands information fron1 the
State but such demands are, for all intensive purposes,
denied by the court.
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If we accept as correct, the premise that the Bill of
Particulars need not provide the Defendant with evidentiary information, although such information is necessary for the defense, and if the State has possession
of the only evidence,(R-25), ·w'hat effect does the exemption of Section 58-13a-17 carry, so far as this Defendant
is coneerned. Obviously, none.
In a case involving the interpretation of alien registration laws, the United States Supreme Court clearly
indicated that, "a statute though plain and unambiguous
on its face, may when applied, violate the due process
law.'' United States vs. Spector, 72 S. Ct. 591, 343 U.S.
169, 9·6 L. Ed. 863, 865. (See also Dissenting Opinion.)
Would it not logically follow that statutes, when construed to frustrate the Defendant's legal rights, fall
within the prohibition against indefinite and ambiguous
laws1
A.s early as 1889, the Utah Supreme Court announced
that due process means every person shall have his day
in court . .Jensen vs. Union Pac"ific Ra·ilroad Company,
G U. 253, 21 P. 994, 995. (See also C7u·istensen vs. Harri~
109 U. 1, lG3 P2d. 314.) Certainly, this would suggest that
the ''day in eonrt'' is not rnere]y physieal appearance in
Court, but is rather a right to appear in Court for the
purpose of defending- with the opportunity of exercising
every eonst1tutjonal and statutory right provided him
by our Federal and State governn1ents. The· right to
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demand information necessary for the defense would
seem to be one of such rights. Whether the information
requested by the defense counsel falls within the terminology of "evidentiary matters" is yet another problem.
Our Uniform Narcotic Drugs Act exempts from the
scope of its prohibition, any drug which contains medicinal qualities and which contains less than one grain of
codeine per fluid ounce·. Yet, one might ask, had evidence
been offered which would have proved that the paregoric
in evidence fell within the above exemption, would the
conviction in the instant case still stand~ Judging from
the disposition made in the Trial Court of this case, it
appears safe to conclude that the conviction would nevertheless stand. Still, such a judgment could be rendered
only if we ignore one or more of the pertinent statutory
provisions involved in this case.
It is convenient to re-emphasize here that the cornplaint of uncertainty is not directed to the wording of
the statutory provisions as such. The indefiniteness and
uncertainty of which we complain is such ·as arises from
the application of the pertinent provisions to the facts
before the court.
It should be noted, also, that one of the reasons the
courts demand clarity and indefiniteness in the wording
and application of statutes is to make it possible for attorneys to advise clients as to the meaning of the statutes
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and the possible ramifications which may be involved.
The statutes must he sufficiently clear so as to serve
as a guide, to courts and counsels alike, in the adjudication of rights and duties of the individual. Due Process

Requvrements of Definiteness in Statut~es, 62 Harv. L.
R,ev. 77, (1948). In alluding to the record on appeal, it
is apparent that neither counsel for the defense nor the
court were guided by the statutory provisions but were,
on the contrary, left to speculate as to their meaning and
application.
The Defendant respectfully submits the Utah Uniform Narcotics Drug Act, as applied in this case, is unconstitutional for uncertainty and indefiniteness and the
conviction should, therefore, be reversed and the cause
rernanded for a trial de nora.
(]QNCL lTSION
Defendant, in the case at bar, was clearly denied his
Rtatutory right under Section 77-21-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953; narnely, the right to obtain, by Bill of Particulars, information necessary for his defense.
Moreover, the provisions of the Utal1 Uniform N areotie Drugs Art, as applied to the Defendant's case, w·ere
uncertain and indefinite, and, thus, violated the Due
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Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution and the Section Seven of our
State Due Process Clause.
Defendant respectfully submits that the judgment
should be reversed and cause remanded for a trial de
novo.
Respectfully submitted,
lMITSUNAGA & ROSS and
KENNETH M. HISATAI(E
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